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Resources and Innovation in Family Businesses: 
The Janus-Face of Family Socio-emotional Preferences 
 
Abstract 
Family business socioemotional preferences are often Janus-faced:  Some strive to create a 
strong business they can pass on to offspring by building innovation-promoting resources 
such as human, relational and financial capital.  Other family firms cater to family desires for 
unqualified nepotism, altruism towards undeserving kin, and appropriation of firm assets to 
fulfill parochial desires that erode these resources. We explore how some such preferences, 
together with their impact on resources and the innovation demands of their markets, shape 
the approach to innovation.   
 
Introduction 
Family businesses are a diverse collection of organizations.  Yet most are 
distinguished by their socio-emotional preferences – namely, non-economic objectives that 
cater to family desires such as keeping the firm in the family, providing jobs for kin, and 
establishing reputation in the community.  Such preferences are Janus-faced however: some 
build resources that facilitate innovation, others do exactly the opposite.  For example, family 
firms that wish to create a robust business to pass on to their relatives have unusually long 
investment time horizons and are willing to sacrifice in the present in order to develop human 
resources, relationships with stakeholders, and financial reserves.  These resources and 
motivations can promote and facilitate innovation.   On the other hand, other family firms 
embrace socioemotional objectives such as family-directed altruism, perquisites and jobs for 
incompetent family members, the use of business resources for personal purposes, and the 
entrenchment of undeserving family executives.  These preferences and practices erode 
human, relational and financial resources, and stifle innovation. 
We show that some businesses succeed over the long run via innovations that exploit 
the resource advantages arising out of some family preferences, whereas others falter because 
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of their attachment to resource-eroding, innovation-killing family practices
1
, particularly in 
volatile environments.  The cases we present illustrate these scenarios and enable us to 
extract lessons for family firms wishing to sustain their competitiveness. The rationale for the 
case selection and the sources of data are described in the Appendix.  
A Typology of Family Business Innovation 
Our proposed framework juxtaposes the non-financial or “socioemotional wealth” 
(SEW) goals of family businesses with the level of innovation needed to compete effectively 
in the different sectors in which they operate.  Some family business owners are preoccupied 
with including family members in the firm, using resources for parochial family purposes, 
and bequeathing the company to offspring
2
.  They use the firm to propagate family-centric 
interests, and are risk averse.   That can hinder their ability to innovate which might deny 
opportunities to the next generation
3
 by threatening firm survival.  At the other extreme the 
family may desire to build a robust business: they invest in the firm and its stakeholders, and 
build the social and human capital resources that enable them to innovate and thrive
4
.  This 
allows them to keep the firm in the family for generations to come.  
We dichotomize these SEW objectives as “feeding parochial family desires” and 
“creating an evergreen organization”.   The former is family-centric in its objectives, and 
caters to the personal interests, emotions and legacies of the family.  It may encompass 
nepotism and managerial entrenchment, and using business resources simply to fulfill family 
preferences – for jobs, perquisites, and kinship harmony5.  That orientation often robs a firm 
of the resources needed to innovate.   
By contrast, the objective to create an evergreen organization is far more 
encompassing as it is aimed, ultimately, at building a healthy, enduring business.  That will 
require investing in a broader array of stakeholders and resources that can support innovation 
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– talented employees, social and financial capital, relationships with external parties, and 
effective governance mechanisms. These two rather different types of SEW objectives will 
tend to be mutually exclusive.  Certainly, these are not the only SEW objective a family may 
have: considerations of community contribution, family reputation, social status and the like 
may also be relevant
6
.   We have focused on the family desires and evergreen polarities as 
these connect especially directly to the issues of family firm innovation. 
Strategic environments can be characterized as high or low velocity. A high velocity 
environment is unstable; one of rapid, disruptive change. Such changes may arise in the 
technologies of the industry, the nature and degree of competition, and in patterns and 
preferences in customer demand.  An environment of low velocity is more stable and evolves 
more predictably and in a less threatening fashion.  In high velocity environments, 
entrepreneurs and managers must be flexible, adaptable and innovative
7
. Although family 
businesses are often portrayed as competing in mature, low innovation markets, many do 
operate in turbulent and competitive sectors that demand significant innovation in products, 
markets and processes.  Again, for expositional purposes, we dichotomize family business 
markets as high versus low velocity, each of which requires a different set of resources and 
capabilities with which to compete and innovate
8
.  
These resources and capabilities concern firstly, the innovative expertise embodied in 
the family firm’s human capital, an asset some family firms have unusual access to due to 
family emotional commitment to the company and its staff, and a willingness on the part of 
family members to work with initiative and devotion for little compensation
9
. Second, is the 
social capital derived from enduring family business’ personal networks that help facilitate 
innovation
10
.  Some families build especially strong ties with stakeholders because of their 
long time horizons, which make them generous and responsive business partners.  Third, 
many family firms are known for their patient financial capital – which may be needed given 
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the risks and lags in revenue generation entailed by many innovations. Finally, some family 
businesses may shine at minimizing agency costs and establishing effective governance 
mechanisms because incentives are aligned both among family owners and between family 
owners and managers
11
. All of these potential resource advantages provide the wherewithal to 
endow firms with superior innovation capabilities
12
.  However, the degree to which such 
resources are abundant relies on the intention among some family owners and managers to 
create an evergreen organization.   
Unfortunately, although some family firms possess such resource advantages, others, 
with more family-centric, parochial and conservative preferences suffer resource 
disadvantages.  Preferences such as nepotism may rob a firm of managerial talent
13
 and 
parental altruism may cause undeserving family employees to shirk their managerial and 
stewardship responsibilities
14
. A desire for family perquisites from the business may drain 
capital needed for innovation, as would the financial conservatism stemming from a 
reluctance to jeopardize family control by issuing debt or equity
15
.  Moreover, cronyism born 
of some kinship and family ties may constrain the broader network of talent and the 
knowledge resources required for innovation.   Family firms confronting such resource 
disadvantages tend to innovate too little and too late. And a lack of innovation in a high 
velocity market will lead to performance difficulties. Even where such difficulties trigger a 
belated innovative initiative to keep a viable firm in the family, the shortage of resources may 
doom the project.  
Our SEW and environmental dichotomies allow us to differentiate four distinct 
approaches to innovation by family businesses, their resource implications, and the outcomes 
expected.  These are illustrated in Figure 1.  Our framework highlights the resources that 
family firms in each quadrant typically lack or have in abundance and which give rise to 
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special innovation advantages or disadvantages.   We develop this framework in the pages 
that follow.  
The evergreen objective aims to provide a robust long term future for the family in the 
business, and perhaps even to make a social contribution.  Our firms in Quadrants 1 and 2 are 
motivated by that purpose. By contrast, the objective of catering to parochial family desires 
and maintaining risk-avoiding tradition constitutes maintaining family control, meeting 
personal perquisites, sacrificing firm resources to achieve family peace, engaging in 
nepotism, and installing managers in entrenched positions. Those priorities are reflected in 
Quadrants 3 and 4.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Quadrant 1: Entrepreneurial Innovators 
Family businesses in Quadrant 1 embrace innovation in a high velocity environment. 
They inculcate innovation as part of an inter-generational culture in order to create an 
evergreen organization. Succeeding family generations are mentored, often from early life, to 
become enthusiastic about and capable at progressive approaches to continual product-market 
innovation.  These businesses frequently have an advantage in developing resources that 
facilitate innovation: these include a long term perspective that induces them to invest in 
enduring relationships with internal and external stakeholders, to contribute patient capital, 
and to forego quick returns.  Most successful companies in this quadrant develop enduring 
associations and solid networks with resource-suppliers and distributors who can facilitate 
and adapt to innovation. Their patient capital, typically provided by family members, enables 
them to undertake innovation projects with longer payoff periods than rivals are willing to 
accept. Their cautious financial management builds war chests to fund innovations internally 
that might otherwise be risky in an uncertain environment with its inevitable challenges and 
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unexpected roadblocks.  Such reserves may be especially critical to family businesses, which 
often are reluctant to dilute control by seeking outside funding.  Internal funding and 
authoritative decision making by family leaders allow innovation projects to be decided upon 
swiftly, and with less comprehensive data.  At the same time, concern for evergreen 
objectives such as family reputation exerts extra pressure on some firms, in the course of their 
innovation initiatives, to exercise assiduous stewardship over company image, quality of 
offerings, and ongoing relationships with stakeholders.  
The examples of Corning and Maison Louis Latour are illustrative of highly 
successful entrepreneurial innovators (see Appendix table). Corning has been producing glass 
related products for well over a century.  Founded and for much of its history controlled and 
managed by members of the Houghton family, Corning has led its industry in innovation 
almost since its inception.  It created the first radio tubes for Marconi, the first television 
picture tubes for General Sarnoff at RCA, the first heat resistant Pyrex glass, the first fiber 
optic cable, and numerous special types of glass for computer digital devices.  The family’s 
objective was to remain forever at the forefront of the industry in which it operated, 
consistently investing in projects with very long term payoff horizons, while being cautious 
to fund these bold ventures with its older, cash cow products.  The family was deeply 
embedded in the community of Corning, New York, where its civic contributions are 
legendary.  For example, after a catastrophic flood, Corning helped to rebuild the entire town 
and kept staff on the payroll even while its plants were idle.  Employee turnover was 
extremely low and promotion from the inside was the norm.  Corning also excelled at 
forming very long term partnerships, some of many decades duration, with inventive firms 
with which it engaged in its projects of innovation, some of which could help in the design 
and production of complex devices.   In short, at Corning human, social, and financial capital 
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born of family values and discipline helped to create an innovation success story and a firm 
that has, despite some serious bumps, proved to be evergreen.
16
  
Maison Louis Latour is an eleventh generation wine producer based in the Burgundy 
region of France, with the current CEO being the seventh Louis Latour. The firm has 
inculcated innovation over multiple generations. A family culture of stewardship assures that 
the business will be innovative throughout successive tenures, and will be in a position to 
bequeath a robust organization to future generations. The current CEO and his father have 
taken the initiative to expand from the traditional Burgundy region and acquire vineyards 
elsewhere in France, for example, in less fashionable Ardeche, Var, Chablis and Beaujolais. 
They also have pioneered varietal wines, which are quite new to France. In Var they are 
developing a quality Pinot Noir styled as a Burgundy but with more stable costs of 
production compared to the Burgundy Pinot Noir. Maison Louis Latour makes use of both 
human and social capital resources in the newer regions in which it operates. In Ardèche, as 
in the Var, they develop relationships through long term and comprehensive contracts with 
local growers. In Chablis and Beaujolais they are working with local growers to build the 
reputation of certain domains as quality wine producers. Maison Louis Latour does not 
always purchase the land itself but forms partnerships with skilled local growers to create a 
balance of power with the growers.  This avoidance of takeovers reduces the financial 
demands needed to fund expansion. Latour has also evolved long term partnerships with 
other family businesses, such as the fourth generation wine freighting company Porter and 
Laker, who have developed innovative ways to transport wine in bulk. The father of its 
current CEO is the president of Latour.   
Latour’s governance policy dictates that the previous generation act as shareholders, 
while the current CEO reports to them during the first ten years of tenure to ensure that the 
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two generations run the company together and reinforce the innovative ethos.  Subject to the 
requirement of competency and a desire to take the reins, the business is typically passed 
from father to eldest son without involving brothers and sisters in the business, although they 
may be equal shareholders.  That policy prevents sibling battles that might detract from the 
company’s ethos.  According to the current CEO: "The biggest advantage of having only one 
family member [in charge] is that you are in a position to hire the best people that you can.  
When you start to have a lot of family members it is difficult to have [talent] from outside to 
come in.  Because I was the only one, and my father was the only one, it [helped] attract the 
best [and most innovative] people in the wine industry in Burgundy".   Unitary family 
leadership also enables the courageous decision making required for bold innovations.  As the 
Marketing Director of Latour’s partner, Taylor-Wakefield expressed it “There is a healthy 
willingness to discuss and to investigate and make a fast decision on whether [we are] going 
to do something or not … without having to have it proved in endless research." 
Quadrant 2: Conservative Innovators 
Family businesses in Quadrant 2 (Q2) also strive to create an evergreen venture, but 
operate in low velocity environments. Often, to achieve that objective, they seek to move 
beyond their sometimes limiting, slow growth domains into more thriving, sometimes more 
competitive, market sectors, typically by setting up a financially independent subsidiary to 
undertake the boldest and riskiest renewal projects. Family may also use the new venture to 
fill positions for young, inexperienced family members who are motivated to innovate, and, 
importantly, to insulate the family reputation and the old business from the risks associated 
jeopardizing the firm as a whole. For example, Q2 firms may protect their core business by 
establishing arms-length subsidiaries in which the next generation plays a key innovative 
role
17
. If the subsidiary turns out not to be profitable and has to be shut down, this can happen 
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without capital, war chests, and a long-term orientation towards relationships – also apply 
here in Q2.  The capital from the cash cow business of the parent may protect the subsidiary 
from financial distress and fund innovation.  Typically, family officers involved in the parent 
may serve on the board of the new venture.  A potential downside of such involvement is that 
although it may provide useful counsel, it may also constrain innovation.  Moreover, the 
social capital of the parent may be of limited relevance for the new subsidiary, so attempts to 
build new networks may be difficult.  
The examples of HMG Paints and Wates Group are illustrative of successful risk 
averse innovators (see Appendix table). HMG Paints is a third generation family business 
based in the UK.  The company operates in a location and sector where many volume paint 
manufacturers have been squeezed out by low cost foreign producers, and it competes mostly 
through moderate product and process innovation in the specialty paints segment of the 
market.  Product innovations include biocidal antifouling for boats, flexible paint for 
commercial truck sides, PVC finishes for architectural coatings, temporary grass markings 
for sports grounds, and anti-graffiti coatings for buildings. The fourth generation is currently 
developing an online marketing business to bring the firm’s products to a wider consumer 
audience.  Apprenticeships encourage children of non-family employees to be involved from 
an early stage to maintain the family culture; they also reduce outsider domination. The 
company boosts its reputation by supporting local community enterprises. Networking with 
other producers is difficult as competition for intellectual property is fierce in some slow 
moving sectors. Rather, social capital is mainly focused on that derived from close networks 
with distributors, some of them other family firms.  The company refuses to recruit outside 
non-executive directors to avoid constraints that might compromise innovative initiatives.  
According to the CEO “our modus operandi is to pursue a sort of organic growth 
within the core business and to be carrying out a few “outer edge” projects that could be very 
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big, very exciting or crash and burn!” Some of these new initiatives have been ring-fenced to 
protect the core activities. For example, whereas the brother of the current CEO is on the 
board of HMG, he has also established a separate spin-off business in the chemicals sector, 
Byotrol, which is now listed on the secondary tier stock market, the Alternative Investment 
Market.  This arrangement avoids exposing the parent company to the unusual risks involved 
in Byotrol.  According to entrepreneur Stephen Falder, (brother of HMG CEO John Falder), 
“Faced with a family business that’s got stability, security, don’t bet the farm… so [in 
Byotrol] we have a small PLC which is completely divorced [from HMG and] a listed 
company the Falder family owns 7% of….Yes spun it out, the right thing to do with 
innovation”.  Thus, in effect, a conservative family has isolated its bolder innovation 
initiatives in a separate business – preserving security for the main company, and providing 
the family with opportunities for riskier rich innovative initiatives in a growing niche of the 
chemicals sector.  As the CEO stated “..the future of 170 people and their families is at stake 
in making the right choices”. 
The Wates Group, one of the largest construction groups in the UK, has also 
developed innovative activities, often involving the next generation, which are ring-fenced in 
innovative subsidiaries. The company has diversified into sectors such as residential 
development, housing, education, local authority work, heritage projects, responsive 
maintenance, and retail and interiors. Family owners position themselves as professional 
stewards who ensure that from the CEO on down, the business will be focused on attracting 
the very best talent and being around for the long term:  as they proclaim on their website: 
“[Our] values, long term vision and financial independence have enabled us to thrive 
throughout the economic ups and downs of more than a century”.   
Wates’ approach to supply chain management is to work in partnership and form 
strategic alliances with a few like-minded sub-contractors with whom they have been 
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working for many decades, in part cemented by family connections.  This has produced a 
strong track record in shortened delivery times, improving standards in health and safety, 
superior quality, more effective processes, cost savings and reliability. As a family-owned 
business, Wates demonstrates unusual respect for its people, communities and the 
environment, embedded and celebrated as values in the rituals of the organization. It has a 
strong social ethos and long record of philanthropy, making deep, long lasting connections 
within communities through its Building Futures program supporting the long term 
unemployed, and via low carbon sustainability programs. The company maintains a strong 
financial base with superior levels of liquidity, a commitment to long term investment, and 
rigorous financial management. Its financial stability is underpinned by a diversified portfolio 
of operations which help insulate it from the macroeconomic challenges of the construction 
sector.   
The Wates Board reinforces its emphasis on external relationships and innovation. It 
consists of the Chairman, Chief Executive, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operations Officer, 
four Family Directors and three independent Non-Executive Directors.  This keeps the firm 
open to outside perspectives for renewal and opportunity and avoids family parochialism. 
The board also is committed to achieving the highest standards of corporate governance, 
conducting its business responsibly, and in accordance with all laws and regulations to which 
Wates’ business activities are subject. It delegates authority for all day to day management of 
the Group’s activities to the Executive Committee which consists of Directors responsible for 
the strategic business units and key functions.   
Quadrant 3:Tardy  Innovators  
Family businesses in Quadrant 3 resist change and innovate relatively little.  Their 
operating in low velocity environments often allows them for many years to maintain family 
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traditions and legacy strategies.  Thus SEW objectives often take the form of providing jobs 
and perquisites for relatives, and are family- rather than business-centric.   A penchant for 
nepotism causes managers to be drawn from too small and shallow a pool of talent. Although 
these firms tend to stick with long-standing networks, they are too often inward looking, 
subject to cronyism, and inflexible. Family shareholders not running the business may 
appropriate assets so that funds for renewal are lacking for strategic initiatives and long term 
investments. Such problems may be exacerbated by family conflicts, especially where those 
in charge are reluctant to prune unproductive members.  Where the firm is large and 
established and enjoys preferential relationships with stakeholders, a lack of competition can 
enable these firms to survive for quite a long time.  Ultimately, however, they do tend to 
founder.  
The example of Eaton’s is illustrative of this dearth of innovation (see Appendix 
table). Eaton’s was a century old Canadian dry goods department store that operated in major 
cities across the country.  Owned and mostly run by members of Toronto’s Eaton family, the 
firm was known for its judicious selection of quality goods, middle range prices, excellent 
service (satisfaction or money refunded, and home delivery of merchandise when those were 
rare policies).  The firm grew to substantial size and the family became wealthy members of 
the Canadian “commercial aristocracy”.   By the 1980s, however, the velocity of the 
environment changed. Eaton’s, began to be squeezed from below by discount merchandisers 
and from above by luxury department stores catering to a growing wealthier class.   At the 
same time, the company had begun to rest on its laurels, allowing some of its stores to 
become stodgy, its famed service ethos to erode, and its selection of merchandise to be 
perceived as quaint and passé, in part because its  information systems were behind the times 
and because the later generations of the family had become complacent.  Innovation in store 
design and merchandising was nowhere to be found.  The family, it seemed, had become less 
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interested in the business and more interested in the rewards it produced for them.  Family 
centric preferences had begun to override the needs of the business, in the process eroding 
human, reputational and financial capital. Margins began to decline. We shall return to the 
fate of Eaton’s in the next section. 
Quadrant 4: Turnarounds – Successful and Not 
Firms in Quadrant 4 have similar family-centric SEW objectives to those in Q3, 
which are especially damaging – usually fatal -- in these high velocity environments.  Thus a 
scenario most relevant to this quadrant is that of the failure or turnaround.  Sometimes the 
history of these companies is one of an entrepreneurial founder failing to provide the next 
generation with the attitudes and skills needed to innovate.   The departure of that person 
leaves the firm without the talent or motivation to renew the company.  The result is that the 
business needs to be turned around by the reassertion of an innovative ethos, either through 
re-entry by the founder, or via the recruitment of competent new executives from within or 
outside the family.  Quadrants 4a and 4b relate to unsuccessful and successful turnarounds, 
respectively, and we shall deal with them in turn.   
Turnarounds can be risky, especially when a firm lacks a talented family successor.  
Bringing in outside managers, or unsuited family members, during a leadership vacuum may 
sacrifice the benefits of the longer term family investment perspective, and evoke a short 
term orientation focused on quick results. As we shall see, this departure from a family’s 
traditional approach can lead to inefficiencies and excessive costs. Moreover, a failure to 
maintain business and family relationships and build new ones may deprive the firm of useful 
innovation partners.   In what is a vicious circle, a lack of effective innovation ultimately 
erodes profitability and thus funding for future innovation. This problem is exacerbated 
where financial control systems have not been established or governance is weak. Finally, 
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conflict and family politics triggered by the crisis may plague the board, as may the arrival of 
an unskilled new generation.  
A continuation of the Eaton’s story from above exemplifies such a risky turnaround. 
At Eaton’s the passing of the old generation and the unwillingness of the more talented 
family members to take part in the business left the firm in hands of an inexperienced and 
whimsical scion of the family – a former race-car driver.  More interested in his hobbies than 
in the business, George Eaton hired a slew of consultants to help renew the company.  But he 
lacked the talent to know which advice to take and the dedication and know-how to 
implement a coherent revitalization program: The result was a very incomplete grafting of 
new ideas onto an old ideology and infrastructure.  Eaton’s implemented an “everyday low 
price” policy that precluded the profitable discount sales which enabled the store to recoup its 
investments on merchandise that did not sell well -- an inevitability in fashion goods 
industries.  Eaton’s also created some “prestige” outlets to compete against higher end 
competitors – but it did so in a half-hearted way and located the stores in less affluent 
neighborhoods, thus failing to attract wealthy customers and also alienating traditional 
clientele.  Customers no longer knew what to expect in pricing, merchandise selection, or 
décor and layouts, which now varied from store to store.   Eaton’s had lost its identity, and its 
clients.  Due to the absence of managerial resources, a demotivated workforce, and an ever 
more precarious balance sheet, the turnaround effort failed and the firm declared bankruptcy.    
Contrast this experience with the successful turnaround dynamics exhibited by Linn 
(Quadrant 4b). Linn is a manufacturer of high end music systems for the home, operating 
within a very competitive and innovative sector. The firm was highly successful in 
developing novel products under the founder (Quadrant 1) but then lost its way when the 
founder became ill in 2003 such that by February 2007, the need to change had become 
imperative as the company had slipped into Quadrant 4. After 2003 there had been two 
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succession attempts that were not successful. Succession attempt 1 (2003-5) involved giving 
non-family senior managers control of their own divisions but this ultimately led to a 
somewhat fragmented organization. Succession attempt 2 (2005-7) involved the appointment 
of a non-family CEO from inside the company, but by February 2007 the bank refused to 
extend the company’s overdraft or support the CEO. The company was carrying debt which 
suddenly became unacceptable for its bank, partly due to the 2007 recession. The bank then 
appointed a turnaround specialist in 2007, the company doctor, who worked with the founder 
to restore the company to financial health. The turnaround was completed by 2009. The son 
of the founder had been working in the business since 2003 as R&D director and was 
appointed CEO in 2009 once the turnaround had been completed and the debt had been paid 
off (succession attempt 3).  The son was at the forefront of the turnaround effort and  
designed a new technology platform which was launched in August 2007. This platform 
addressed the growing customer demand for streaming music from hard drives and the 
internet. It delivered higher performance and quality than any other product on the market 
and thus allowed Linn to establish a leading position in their industry, which they have since 
retained. The new platform therefore played a significant part in the turnaround, offering 
something highly innovative to the market, and helping Linn to repay the bank. “I had a very 
clear understanding of the kind of company he [father] wants Linn to be [more innovative] … 
and was clear of what I needed to do”. The turnaround thus “restored the company back to 
my father’s original vision”. According to the current CEO the non-family managers 
involved in the two previous succession attempts “were just doing what they thought was the 
right way to grow the company and they maybe didn’t share the same values [as those that 
are] much more attributable to owner-managed family businesses” and “The company was 
not in shape, innovation had not progressed at the rate it ought to have done in those 
intervening years [since 2003].  
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Governance at Linn was altered in the process of each succession attempt. The 
founder created the group structure in 2003 (phase 1) and the board at that time consisted, in 
essence, of the most senior people in the company. When the non-family CEO was appointed 
in 2005 (phase 2), the board became a formal ‘family’ board made up of family members and 
the non-family CEO. This board did not support the management adequately as its objectives 
tended to be dominated by family objectives. In 2009 (phase 3), under the son and current 
CEO and after the turnaround, Linn transitioned from a family board to a professional board 
where a more effective, objective, governing body was established, with three non-family 
outside directors selected because of their experience: a turnaround specialist (operations), a 
marketing consultant (marketing) and a chief technology officer from one of the suppliers 
(technology). In other words, the outside directors covered the three main areas of the 
business. The current Linn board now has significant independence, more balanced 
objectives and extensive business experience. Many of the board own Linn products so they 
understand and support the company’s innovative culture. “What we have today is a board 
that …challenge but they support, they’re an effective way of formalising the relationship 
between me and my father.” 
The current CEO states about Linn’s innovation process that “if your values are clear 
then everybody can understand...innovation is continuous...a lot of our innovation is grass 
roots… because the engineers/everyone can understand the company values therefore that 
allows the engineers to innovate from a grass roots level”.  Moreover, the new management 
is in the process of successfully aligning opportunities with the emerging innovative 
capabilities. “[capabilities] they’re always growing…. we’re building on them …adding 
capability all the time”.  Financial resources are sometimes ring fenced for new business 
ideas, some of which have their own 3/5 year plan. The renewed presence of family technical 
and managerial talent, combined with good governance, and continuous innovations, has 
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helped to get the company back to Quadrant 1 where it was in 2003, before the founder 
became ill. Linn remains today one of the most innovative companies in its industry. 
 
Discussion 
Certainly, firms are by no means “stuck” within any of our quadrants.  The altering 
influence of family and the changes in leadership as different family members get involved 
may be important sources of transition.  Eaton’s was never the same in its approach to 
strategy and innovation after its last succession in family leadership.   Linn moved from a 
creative approach with its founder (Quadrant1) to a troubled situation after several failed 
succession attempts, financial problems and weak governance (Quadrant 4a). The company 
finally resolved its problems with the help of a turnaround specialist, several product 
introductions, and a new family successor (Quadrant 4b) and is now firmly back in Quadrant 
1. Another source of transition may be the changing environment such that an older approach 
no longer works and there develops a mismatch between family governance and the demands 
of the market, as was the case at Linn.  In other words, our quadrants represent common 
configurations rather than fixed boundaries
18
. 
It is important, moreover, to recognize that families can be as different as their socio-
demographic characteristics and the personalities of their members.  As such it is dangerous 
to postulate any one influence of families on innovation.  For example, where there are 
numerous family members who share power but cannot get along because of childhood or 
parental friction, then concerted innovative action may be very difficult.  Similarly, where an 
incompetent successor takes over simply because that person is a favorite child of the 
founder, that too augurs poorly for the success of the innovative effort.  In short, the human 
element of the family looms large in these businesses, and so often the very best clues as to 
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their innovative potential lies not so much in a firm’s systems and structures, but in the 
talents, motivations and interactions of the family members involved.   These familial factors 
shape the SEW priorities that we have highlighted, along with the nature of the resources they 
enable or inhibit.  Indeed, we see from our examples how family SEW priorities are by no 
means uniform: those concerned with longevity and a multiplicity of stakeholders act for the 
benefit of innovative family businesses, while the more parochial family-centered priorities 
can hobble innovation. 
Challenges and Lessons for Managers 
For expositional purposes we have simplified the array of choices facing family firms 
and their innovative missions in order to emphasize the Janus-face of family SEW 
preferences. For example, we have shown how family preferences regarding nepotism despite 
successor incompetence (the Eaton’s example) can impede innovation, whereas an emphasis 
on family traditions of quality and pioneering can serve to enhance innovative efforts (the 
Linn example). It remains important to ask what family businesses must do – and what must 
they avoid doing – in order to choose the right side of this dichotomy?   
Our analysis suggests that above all it is vital for them to embrace an attitude of 
stewardship.  One family CEO told us he viewed the business not as something he owned, but 
as a precious asset of which he was the caretaker. He saw his job as keeping the business 
healthy for the benefit of later generations and the larger community.  But given the 
inevitable changes in his business environment he stated that innovation was a necessity, not 
an option, in order for the business to remain evergreen. Clearly, family principals must 
foster stewardship to develop resources in which family firms have an advantage, and which 
bestow superior  innovation capability.   
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At the same time, family firms must avoid the pitfalls of hyper-conservatism -- 
governance structures that sap resources, spoiling family members, and favoring nepotism – 
especially where the managerial task is complex. For example, as suggested by the case of 
Latour, a desire to continue father-to-son succession can work well only if the son is 
appropriately motivated and competent at innovation.  Other enemies to innovation include 
glass ceilings for non-family managers, resistance to change, intolerant cultures, and personal 
loyalties that mire firms in old technologies and inappropriate locations.    
Our analysis enables us to draw some general lessons regarding the different resource 
configurations that need to be developed to sustain innovation, contingent on the environment 
in which the family business operates.   
Family firms seeking to develop evergreen innovative family businesses in high 
velocity environments need to make long term investments in family and non-family human 
capital involving the development of a cohesive corporate culture and ample mentorship by 
the previous generation, establish long term relationships and networks with resource-
suppliers and distributors, prudently manage finances to build a war chest to fund longer term 
innovation, and build a focused board to ensure that the innovative ethos is maintained. 
Family firms seeking to develop evergreen innovative family businesses in low 
velocity environments need to make long term investments in the next family generation 
interested in and capable of starting new and innovative ventures, develop mechanisms to 
involve the next generation of non-family employees to maintain the family culture; build 
new social capital  to enter new innovative areas, utilize capital from cash cow businesses to 
fund innovation, and perhaps insulate risk to the parent by conducting innovation through a 
separate subsidiary with a board that provides monitoring but does not constrain innovation
19
.  
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In short, it will be necessary for the family to distinguish among those socioemotional 
preferences and objectives that spawn the creation of resources needed to ensure innovation, 
evergreen survival and superior relationships with stakeholders, and those oriented towards 
parochial family benefits that curtail resource-building, curb innovation, and threaten long-
term survival. 
Conditions for Innovation and Family Resources 
Effective organizational action -- innovation in products, markets and processes 
included
20
 -- can only take place when three conditions are present jointly: awareness of the 
need to act, the motivation to undertake the action, and the capability to act effectively.
21
   
Family resource advantages play a role in either facilitating or impeding each of these 
conditions.   For example, awareness of opportunities and shortcomings that suggest the need 
for innovation may be enhanced via strong relationships that families build with partner 
organizations or key clients.  Social capital and trust may strengthen those relationships.  By 
the same token, family members’ psychological ownership of the firm may provide them 
with the motivation and incentive to innovate, despite the costs and risks such innovation 
might entail.  Because there are frequently strong personal ties between family members and 
their employees, some family firms are able to create cultures in which there are powerful 
reciprocal loyalties among the family and its staff (this was exemplified at HMG Paints).  
That can create energized and highly productive human capital resources that non-family firm 
rivals that are more formalized, bureaucratic and impersonal would find difficult to imitate
22
.  
Finally, the capability to innovate may be enhanced by long term investment horizons, patient 
capital and loyal stakeholders
23
.  In short, the resources which family firms have an 
advantage in building may all contribute to effective innovation outcomes.  
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Unfortunately, family resource disadvantages can prevent effective innovation by 
acting on these three conditions, and this again relates to the more parochial, insular and 
family centered socioemotional family priorities we have discussed. Awareness may be 
hobbled when family executives who tend to have long tenures and are entrenched in their 
jobs for decades grow stale and unresponsive.  Motivation may be lacking where later 
generation family members, often passive owners, wish to draw capital from the enterprise 
instead of investing it for the future benefit of the business.  Family conflict can have a 
similar effect.  Finally, capability to innovate may be hobbled by weak managers selected via 
nepotism and by the extraction of funds from the business by family members who are 
alienated from the family or the firm.    
10 Constructive Steps 
There are a number of ways a family can facilitate innovation by nurturing the 
positive resources and avoiding the forces of resource erosion.  First, they must foster 
attitudes favorable to innovation across the generations: to transmit the passion and creativity 
of many founders to the many who follow them.  This not only involves the family members 
who will take over the company but also other next generation family members who will 
become influential shareholders.  That may be achieved by passing on values and legacies 
that celebrate innovation and renewal, even beginning in the family hearth, by regularly 
recalling past achievements in innovation and the courageous quests required, and by 
encouraging a firm culture of creativity through meritocratic promotion.  This may mean that 
cherished practices involving, say, father-to-eldest son succession may need to be altered if 
the eldest son in a particular generation does not possess the competences or motivation 
required for innovation
24
. The process of deciding whether the eldest son is the best potential 
innovative successor needs to begin early in case alternative candidates need to be identified 
and mentored. A climate of innovation may also be aided by flat organization structures and 
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excellent cross functional and vertical communications, by welcoming experimentation, and 
by tolerating errors.  
Second, because innovation, especially in more volatile environments, demands 
significant managerial and often technical and creative human capital, expertise and 
motivation are essential.  This can sometimes be fostered via formal education, having family 
members garner work experience at innovative firms outside the family company, and by 
mentoring later generation family members in various roles in the family firm.   
Third, where there is too little innovative talent in the family, it will be essential to 
hire outside experts, and often to eschew nepotism in high level management positions.  
Moreover, where, in competitive environments family managers lose touch with the market 
or become obsolete in their competences, their kinship must not promote entrenchment, and 
the board must act to replace them.  Indeed, as noted, because of the personal nature of family 
firms and the freedom of family owners and managers to take a long-term view, they may be 
able to develop enduring win-win relationships with their employees by taking the time to 
hire very selectively, mentor assiduously, and reward generously.  Although the initial costs 
of such an approach might be significant, the long term benefits may make such “culture-
building” worthwhile. 
Fourth, it will be useful to develop governance through expertise and independent 
judgment on boards of directors that is consistent with delivering the kind of innovation 
needed for firm survival and success.  Outside management and board members with 
innovative experience, or even turnaround experience, may be recruited to provide added 
expertise and fresh perspectives on market opportunities.   There must also be an attitude of 
commercial objectivity and independence from management such that the board is able to 
oust poorly performing family members.  Boards also will have to be able to evaluate and be 
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willing to approve the significant investments often needed for projects of innovation.  At the 
same time, they will have to have the independence from family politics needed to deny 
parochial requests from family members that rob the firm of financial resources or saddle it 
with inferior human capital. Family firms with ‘family boards’ may be able to pre-empt 
problems by approaching their accountants, lawyers or banks in order to find suitable 
candidates for their boards
25
. 
Fifth, there is a need for innovative family firms to develop networks of long-term 
partners who share their innovative ethos and who can be adaptive and help co-create 
innovation. And because innovation is dynamic, board development involving outsiders can 
also help extend the social networks needed to facilitate innovative activity in new areas 
beyond traditional activities. This makes it especially useful to recruit board members for 
both their independent expertise and their contacts.      
Sixth, decision making and implementation processes must be developed that 
facilitate innovation compatible with different SEW goals, and which meet the needs of the 
competitive environment. In other words, it is important to achieve an appropriate match 
between family objectives and environmental demands. Sometimes a family is so dominant 
that an ideology of innovation runs rampant and the firm innovates far more than their 
environment would reward.  More likely, they may be entrenched in past ways and innovate 
too little. Furthermore, the time horizon of family objectives needs to be consistent with the 
demands of the market if an innovation is to be successful.  Too short a time horizon will not 
allow for the funds, planning, or human resources required for innovation; too long a time 
horizon may drain firm resources and tax family funds due to the long-delayed payoffs.  
Seventh, although we focused for expositional purposes on distinguishing two aspects 
of SEW goals of particular salience for innovation, in practice there can be a grey area where 
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there are gradations between these poles.  Further, SEW-related goals may co-exist with other 
goals and will probably  change over the life-cycle of the firm
26
. The statistic that few family 
firms are handed down to the grandchildren of the founder is one possible indicator of the 
changing goals of the family over time
27
.  As a result, there is a need for careful negotiation 
among owners and managers to resolve potential conflicts between goals that may 
compromise the need for innovation if the family business is to be able to continue to 
compete effectively or even survive. If conflicting objectives compromise survival it is 
important for this to be recognized, and acted upon, as soon as possible, and for alternate 
plans to be set in motion, for example, the possible sale of the company to the management 
team or to a commercial buyer.  
Eighth, our examples also indicated that the velocity of the competitive environment 
may change over the life-cycle of the family business. Such changes call forth a need for 
family businesses to adopt governance and managerial processes that anticipate 
environmental changes and facilitate requisite changes in resources and capabilities.        
Ninth, as illustrated by our contrasting cases, there is a need for prudent financial 
management.  Careful husbanding of financial resources is crucial if the family firm is to 
reconcile the need to be innovative on the one hand, and maintaining family control of the 
firm by eschewing external finance on the other.    
Finally, it will be essential to introduce mechanisms that ensure that parochial 
initiatives compromising long term SEW and commercial aspirations will be terminated. All 
businesses face the problem of abandoning the pet projects of key personnel. In family 
businesses this may be a particular challenge wherever it uproots family members involved in 
such activities.   Therefore procedures must be in place to redeploy these employees 
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elsewhere in the firm.  In short, there is a constant need to be vigilant in reconciling family-
centric SEW objectives with the resource and innovation requirements of the business.   
It is encouraging that in an age in which short-termism has dominated many non-
family firms, the family firm, if managed properly to exploit its preferences and the natural 
resource advantages they bring, may be an especially productive fount of significant 
innovation for many decades to come.  The framework we have developed provides a new 
typology of innovation in family businesses based on different goals and environments. It 
shows that different family goals, in isolation, offer a partial understanding of innovation in 
family firms. Clearly, environmental velocity is an important moderator of the performance 
consequences of family firm innovation, and thus family firm goals.  All of these factors must 
be considered in order to have a more complete picture of innovation in family businesses.  
Appendix: Case Data 
We have selected our cases in order to illustrate all of the different segments of our typology 
and to include firms where information could best be accessed on their histories and teams.    
We have used multiple and varied sources to collect data on the cases presented.  We 
employed face-to-face interviews, company websites and other secondary sources such as 
financial and business reports, presentations, press releases, magazine articles and books. For 
some of our cases, interviews were conducted with both CEOs of the family businesses as 
well as with other family and non-family members and stakeholders involved in the firms. 
For those cases, interviews lasted between one and three hours.  
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Figure 1: Innovation and Family SEW Objectives 
 
 
Strategic 
Environment  
SEW Objectives 
Creating an evergreen 
organization 
Feeding parochial family desires 
High velocity Quadrant 1: Entrepreneurial 
Innovator  
Inculcate innovation as part of the 
inter-generational culture   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources:  
Human: 
. long term investments in people 
(family and non-family)  
 
. cohesive corporate culture  
. ample mentorship by previous 
generation   
 
 
 
Social: 
. long term relationships and 
networks established with 
resource-suppliers and distributors 
 
Finance: 
.cautious financial management to 
build war chest to fund innovation 
. longer term innovation projects 
than rivals (patient capital);  
 
Governance: 
. assiduous stewardship over 
intangible assets 
. focused board to ensure 
innovative ethos maintained 
 
 
Case example: Corning, Maison 
Louis Latour  
 
Quadrant 4: Turnarounds 
Failure to keep up with innovation means that when it 
eventually occurs it is necessary to turnaround the 
company with too few resources. Innovation can’t exist 
in isolation and badly handled succession can impact on 
an otherwise innovative firm 
 
Quadrant 4a:Pre-
turnaround 
Quadrant 4b:Post-
turnaround 
Resources: 
Human: 
. First generation 
innovative but lack of 
planning over departure 
loses innovative human 
resource 
.next generation sleepy or 
incompetent to innovate 
(nepotism, entrenchment) 
or absent 
Social: 
.lack of maintenance of 
existing social networks 
.failure to build new social 
networks 
Finance: 
. lack of innovation erodes 
profitability and funding 
for innovation 
. lack of financial control 
over innovation.  
Governance:  
. family politics leading to 
stagnation 
. Lack of formal board with 
outside directors 
.  
 
Resources: 
Human: 
. non family human 
resources don’t share same 
values  
. psychological ownership 
of the business,  
Social: 
. Social capital a critical 
part of turnaround to 
identify turnaround 
expertise 
. resurrection of family 
values / strong traditions 
reasserted 
 
Finance: 
. financial control of 
innovation implemented 
 
 
 
Governance: 
. ‘professional’ board 
created including family 
and non-family members 
 
 
 
Case example: Eaton’s; 
Linn  
 
Low velocity Quadrant 2: Conservative 
Innovators 
Diversifying innovation ring-
fenced as a subsidiary within the 
group. Balanced approach to 
innovation 
 
Resources: 
Human: 
.  “kids” interested and capable of 
starting new and innovative 
venture 
. apprenticeships and training 
Quadrant 3:Tardy Innovators  
Hyper-conservatism  
Too little innovation 
 
 
 
Resources: 
Human:  
. nepotism and selection from too small a management 
pool 
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encourage children of non-family 
employees to get involvement 
from an early stage to maintain 
family culture. 
Social: 
.existing social capital may be of 
limited relevance for new activity 
. Networking difficult due to 
intense competition for IP 
Finance: 
. Conservative parent firm 
preserves capital from a cash cow 
business and stays safe from 
bankruptcy, also provides slack to 
fund innovation. 
Governance: 
.parent risk insulated through 
separate subsidiary 
. parent family board involvement 
in innovating new subsidiary may 
provide monitoring but constrain 
innovation  
 
Case examples: Wates Group; 
HMG Paints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social:  
. stick with existing, longstanding networks 
 
 
 
Finance:  
. appropriation of assets by greedy family members 
 
 
 
 
Governance: 
. family conflict 
. abandonment of long-term view 
.entrenchment  
 
 
 
 
Case examples: Eaton’s (Canada)  
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Appendix: Family Related Innovation Resource Advantages and Shortcomings from our Case Examples: 
Resource 
Categories 
Background Human  Social Finance Governance 
Corning Founded 
1851; glass 
related 
products; 
public; New 
York, USA 
Productive long 
term 
investments in 
people 
 
Cohesive 
corporate 
culture  
 
Ample 
mentorship 
across the 
generations  
 
Favorable 
relationships 
and networks 
established with 
resource-
suppliers and 
distributors 
 
Family deeply 
embedded in 
community 
Cautious financial 
management to build 
war chest to fund 
innovation 
 
Longer term 
innovation projects 
than rivals (patient 
capital);  
 
Assiduous 
stewardship over 
intangible assets 
 
Maison 
Louis 
Latour 
Founded 
1797; 
eleventh 
generation; 
wine 
producer; 
private; 
France 
Utilize 
expertise of 
local growers in 
areas they have 
expanded into.  
 
 
Win-win 
contracts and 
relationships 
with distributors 
and other wine 
producers 
 
Long-term 
partnerships 
with other 
family firms 
Ample internal funds 
 
Economies in 
innovation by using 
relationships/contracts 
in new areas rather 
than takeovers 
Energized family 
culture of 
stewardship 
Eaton’s Founded 
1869; dry 
goods 
department 
stores; 
public until 
bankruptcy 
Canada; 
70,000 
employees 
prior to 
failure 
Older 
generation 
owners and 
managers 
sleepy and 
complacent 
(nepotism, 
entrenchment) 
or absent as 
effective 
retailing 
executives 
 
 
Costly failure to 
maintain good 
relationships 
with clients due 
to stodgy stores 
and 
merchandise 
 
Increasing 
discontent 
among staff 
who see decline 
in Eaton’s 
quality image 
 
Lack of innovation 
and failure to keep up 
with emerging 
competition and 
changing fashions 
erodes profitability  
Decreasing 
psychological 
ownership of the 
business by the 
family in charge 
 
Family politics 
contributes to 
stagnation 
 
Non-family 
managers favor 
short term focus 
 
Linn 
During 
Phase 2 
Founded 
1973; now 
second 
generation; 
High end 
music 
systems; 
private; 
Scotland 
Two succession 
plans failed 
leading to crisis 
(along with the 
recession).  
Company 
doctor (bank 
appointed), 
founder and 
second 
generation 
family restore 
the firm  
 
Social capital 
used as a 
critical part of 
turnaround to 
identify 
turnaround 
expertise, find 
NEDs. 
Innovative, but 
company debt 
becomes unacceptable 
to bank during 
recession 
 
Turned around by  
‘external’ company 
doctor with help from 
new innovations 
Lack of formal 
board or 
subjective ‘family 
board’ 
 
Turnaround 
involves setting up 
a new professional 
board with more 
objective NEDs 
Wates 
group 
Founded 
1897; 
Inexperienced  
 
Long-standing 
strategic 
Conservative parent 
firm preserves capital 
Family directors 
strong presence on 
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Construction 
and related 
sectors; 
private; UK 
based but 
worldwide 
offices; 
2,500 
employees 
“kids” 
interested and 
capable of 
starting new 
and innovative 
venture 
 
alliances with 
few like-minded 
sub-contractors 
in core area, 
 
Existing social 
capital may be 
of limited 
relevance for 
new activity 
 
from a cash cow 
business and stays 
safe from bankruptcy, 
also provides slack to 
fund innovation. 
 
main board but 
includes outside 
directors 
 
Parent family 
board involvement 
in innovating new 
subsidiary 
provides 
monitoring but 
constrains 
innovation 
 
Parent risk 
insulated through 
separate 
subsidiary/spin-off 
 
 
HMG 
Paints 
Founded 
1930; Third 
generation; 
Speciality 
paints; 
private; 
England  
Apprenticeships 
encourage 
children of non-
family 
employees to 
get involvement 
from an early 
stage to 
maintain family 
culture. 
 
Operations 
board made up 
of non-family 
and family 
employees 
 
Offspring given 
challenging 
projects abroad 
– new markets 
Networking is 
difficult due to 
intense 
competition for 
IP 
 
 
Ample provision of 
initial finance for new 
projects/subsidiaries 
 
Ultimately finance the 
spin-offs by listing on 
stock exchange (AIM) 
 
Parent risk 
insulated through 
separate 
subsidiary/spin-off 
 
 
No desire to have 
outside NEDs  
 
Eaton’s -
During 
Turnaround 
 
Founded 
1869; dry 
goods 
department 
stores; 
public until 
bankruptcy 
Canada; 
70,000 
employees 
prior to 
failure 
Inferior family 
executive enters 
the firm to try 
to save the day  
 
Nepotism and 
selection from 
too small a 
management 
pool 
 
Stuck with 
dated, 
longstanding 
networks 
 
Appropriation of 
assets by greedy 
family members 
 
 
Abandonment of 
long-term view 
 
Executive 
entrenchment  
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